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SCRUTINIZING THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT: HOW 
THE COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS THE “LEVELS 
OF SCRUTINY” QUAGMIRE IN UNITED STATES V. 
SKOIEN 
 
 
KYLE J. POZAN∗ 
 
Cite as: Kyle J. Pozan, Scrutinizing the Seventh Circuit: How the Court Failed to 
Address the “Levels of Scrutiny” Quagmire in United States v. Skoien, 6 SEVENTH 
CIRCUIT REV. 337 (2010), at http://www.kentlaw.edu/7cr/v6-1/pozan.pdf. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In an emphatic proclamation that may have far-reaching 
implications for Second Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court 
recently held that the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense is 
fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty.1 In a plurality opinion, 
the Court in McDonald v. City of Chicago declared that the Second 
Amendment right to keep and bear arms for self-defense is 
incorporated and fully applicable to the States by virtue of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2   
Similar to the First and Fourth Amendments, the Second 
Amendment codifies a pre-existing right3 and has recently been the 
focus of two of the most prominent Supreme Court decisions in the 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2011, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., Political Science, 2008, Indiana University Bloomington. 
1 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) 
(plurality opinion). 
2 Id.; see District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 570–71 (2008) 
[hereinafter Heller I]. 
3 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3066; Heller I, 554 U.S. at 591–92. 
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past decade. Discussion concerning the Second Amendment is not 
reserved for the recondite and esoteric debates of academia. Rather, 
the discussion extends to the public forum, where there are arguments 
on the scope of the right to keep and bear arms, rallies that demand 
rigorous gun control laws,4 and theories regarding the intent of the 
Framers of the Bill of Rights that divide the public, politicians, and 
scholars. 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in McDonald was preceded by the 
landmark case of District of Columbia v. Heller (Heller I).5 The 
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the District of Columbia 
Circuit, invalidating a law banning the possession of handguns in the 
District of Columbia, but in doing so neglected to identify a precise 
level of judicial scrutiny;6 rather, the Court left the difficult task of 
determining the applicable level of scrutiny to the various federal 
courts, a challenge they would be forced to face when presented with 
subsequent challenges to laws banning the possession of firearms. The 
decision not to address the judicial scrutiny quandary in Heller I was 
mimicked by the Court in McDonald and has subsequently been 
followed by a number of federal courts.7 Recently, when presented 
with the opportunity to address the “‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire”8 
left unanswered by Heller I and McDonald,9 the Seventh Circuit 
                                                 
4 Saul Cornell, The Second Amendment Under Fire: The Uses of History and 
the Politics of Gun Control, HISTORY MATTERS (Jan. 2001), http://historymatters. 
gmu.edu/d/5200. 
5 Heller I, 554 U.S. at 570–71. 
6 Id. at 571 (“Under any of the standards of scrutiny the Court has applied to 
enumerated constitutional rights, this prohibition—in the place where the importance 
of the lawful defense of self, family, and property is most acute—would fail 
constitutional muster.”). 
7 See cases cited infra notes 128–29. 
8 United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641–42 (7th Cir. 2010) [hereinafter 
Skoien III]. 
9 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3066 (2010); Heller I, 
554 U.S. at 627–29. 
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declined to engage in meaningful judicial review.10 This Comment 
will critique the Seventh Circuit’s decision. 
                                                
This Comment will begin with a brief discussion of Heller I and 
will examine the impact of the Supreme Court’s proclamation that the 
right to keep and bear arms for self-defense is a right that precedes the 
Constitution. Part II introduces the Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun 
Control Act of 1968, a statute that bars individuals convicted of 
misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence from possessing firearms.11 
This section begins with the history behind the enactment of the 
Lautenberg Amendment and ends with the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the amendment in the context of Second Amendment 
jurisprudence after Heller I. Part II also analyzes the factual 
background and procedural history leading up to the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. Skoien (Skoien III), and will include a 
critique of the court’s decision in the aforementioned case. It will be 
suggested that the Seventh Circuit erred by failing to confront the 
“‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire”12 when presented with the opportunity 
in Skoien III. Part III will attempt to discern why a majority of courts 
after Heller I applied the doctrine of intermediate scrutiny to 
legislation that infringed on the right to keep and bear arms for self-
defense. This Comment will conclude with an abridged review of 
McDonald and will suggest that there is sufficient case law to provide 
a foundation for the application of strict scrutiny analysis to the 
Lautenberg Amendment. 
 
I. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER 
 
Heller I is a watershed case wherein the Supreme Court struck 
down the District of Columbia’s handgun ban because the Second 
Amendment “elevates above all other interests the right of law-
abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and 
 
10 Skoien III, 614 F.3d at 641. 
11 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006). 
12 Skoien III, 614 F.3d at 641–42. 
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home.”13 In Heller I, special police officer Dick Anthony Heller 
brought an action challenging the District’s handgun ban on Second 
Amendment grounds and sought to enjoin the District from enforcing 
the aforementioned gun control statute.14 The Supreme Court 
embarked on a lengthy review of historical texts to aid in interpreting 
the Second Amendment.15 The Court highlighted post-ratification 
sentiments, pre-Civil War case law, and post-Civil War legislation and 
concluded that precedent does not preclude the espousal of the original 
understanding of the Second Amendment.16 Following a searching 
inquiry and textualist reading of the Second Amendment, the Court 
held that the Second Amendment codifies a pre-existing right to keep 
and bear arms for self-defense.17 Therefore, the Court declared 
unconstitutional the District of Columbia’s ban on the possession of 
handguns under its interpretation of the Second Amendment.18 The 
Court, however, maintained that “nothing in our opinion should be 
taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of 
firearms,” which are “presumptively lawful” under the Court’s 
ruling.19 The Court then identified a number of “presumptively 
lawful” regulatory measures, specifically prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,20 and stated that 
it “identif[ies] these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only
examples; [the] list does not purport to be exhaustive.”
 as 
                                                
21 In addition, 
the Court in Heller I suggested that the two exacting levels of 
heightened scrutiny—intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny—should 
 
13 Heller I, 554 U.S. at 635. 
14 Id. at 574–76. 
15 Id. at 605–27. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 625. 
18 Id. at 635. 
19 Id. at 626, 627 n.26. 
20 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 
352 (5th Cir. 2009). 
21 Heller I, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26. 
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be applied to laws that interfere with the Second Amendment right to
keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family, and pr 22
 
operty.  
                                                
The Court’s decision in Heller I has resulted in a myriad of 
challenges to existing firearm legislation. By rejecting the collective 
rights interpretation of the Second Amendment,23 the Supreme Court 
enabled the Second Amendment to be incorporated and fully 
applicable to the States by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.24 Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, 
cautioned that the Heller I ruling would leave lower federal courts 
without a clear standard for resolving challenges to existing firearm 
legislation.25 Justice Stevens was correct to caution against the Court’s 
decision in Heller I. As evidenced by the recent Seventh Circuit case, 
Skoien III, the federal courts have had difficulty adjudicating Second 
Amendment challenges to laws that infringe on the Second 
Amendment. In Skoien III, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Lautenberg Amendment in 
the face of a Second Amendment challenge.26 However, the court 
parroted the majority in Heller I and refused to apply a specific 
standard of scrutiny.27  
 
II. UNITED STATES V. SKOIEN 
 
Defendant Steven Skoien was convicted in 2006 of domestic 
battery in a Wisconsin circuit court and sentenced to two years’ 
probation.28 As a condition of his probation and in correspondence 
 
22 Id. at 628–29; see id. at 628 n.27. 
23 Id. at 579–80; see United States v. Skoien, 857 F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir. 2009) 
[hereinafter Skoien II]; Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 711 (7th Cir. 
1999). 
24 See McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (plurality opinion) 
(holding that the right to keep and bear arms is fundamental to our scheme of 
ordered liberty). 
25 Id. at 718–19 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
26 Skoien III, 614 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2010). 
27 See id. 
28 Skoien II, 587 F.3d. at 806. 
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with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), Skoien was prohibited from possessing a 
firearm.29 In 2007, his probation officer learned that he had purchased 
a deer-hunting license.30 In light of the aforementioned discovery, the 
probation officer believed that Skoien had purchased a firearm, and 
probation agents searched his home as a result.31 Upon searching 
Skoien’s property, Wisconsin probation agents discovered a 
Winchester twelve-gauge shotgun, shotgun ammunition, a statute-
issued tag for a gun deer kill in the name of Steven Skoien, and a deer 
carcass in Skoien’s garage.32 Skoien was subsequently indicted by a 
federal grand jury for possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(9).33  
  
A. Skoien’s Second Amendment Claim 
 
Skoien filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds 
that § 922(g)(9) violated his Second Amendment right to keep and 
bears arms.34 At the time that Skoien filed his motion to dismiss, 
Seventh Circuit precedent precluded him from alleging that § 
922(g)(9) contravened the Second Amendment.35 As a result, the 
district court denied Skoien’s motion to dismiss.36 Shortly after the 
                                                 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment at ¶ 2, United States v. Skoien, 
2008 WL 4682598 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 27, 2008) (No. 08-cr-12-bbc) [hereinafter 
Skoien I]; see U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
35 See Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 710 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that the link between the ability to “keep and bear Arms” and “a well 
regulated Militia” is suggestive of the fact that the right does not extend to 
individuals, but rather to the people collectively and only to the extent necessary to 
protect their interest in protection by a militia); see also United States v. Price, 328 
F.3d 958, 961 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that § 922(g)(9) is constitutional under the 
“collective rights” model for interpreting the Second Amendment). 
36 Skoien I, 2008 WL 4682598, at *1. 
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aforementioned denial, the Supreme Court in Heller I held that the 
Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess a firearm 
for a lawful purpose, unrelated to service in a militia.37 Consequently, 
Skoien filed a motion to reconsider the motion to dismiss the 
indictment.38  
In the defendant’s brief, a considerable amount of emphasis was 
placed on Heller I,39 which struck down the District of Columbia’s 
handgun ban because it was too broad, extending to an entire class of 
arms that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for the 
lawful purposes of self-defense and hunting.40 Skoien claimed that the 
Winchester twelve-gauge shotgun is “clearly an ‘arm’ that is 
overwhelmingly chosen by American society for the lawful purpose of 
hunting.”41 Furthermore, in light of the fact that the Court in Heller 
declared that the Second Amendment codified a pre-existing 
individual right to keep and bear arms, Skoien argued that the court in 
the instant case must declare unconstitutional § 922(g)(9) if it 
determines that the statute is not narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling governmental interest.42  
Judge Barbara Crabb of the Western District of Wisconsin 
considered the motion to dismiss filed by Skoien, which alleged that § 
922(g)(9) violated the Second Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.43 Skoien acknowledged that the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(9), but argued 
                                                 
37 Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 625–26 (2008). 
38 See generally Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider Motion 
to Dismiss Indictment, Skoien I, 2008 WL 4682598 (No. 08-cr-12-bbc). 
39 See generally id. 
40 Heller I, 554 U.S. at 625–30 (only the sorts of weapons that were in common 
use at the time the Second Amendment was ratified are protected). 
41 Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider Motion to Dismiss 
Indictment, supra note 38, at 3. 
42 Id. at 4–5. 
43  Skoien I, No. 08-cr-12-bbc, 2008 WL 4682598, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 27, 
2008). 
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that the statute should be reevaluated in light of the recent Supreme 
Court decision in Heller I.44 
In her analysis, Judge Crabb noted that the Court in Heller held 
that the Second Amendment right to bear arms protects an individual 
right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation, but stated 
that the Court did not address the constitutionality of § 922(g)(9).45 In 
addition, Judge Crabb mentioned that the majority cautioned against 
interpreting its decision as a suggestion that all gun laws and firearm 
restrictions are unconstitutional.46 Rather, the Court declared that its 
opinion does not cast doubt on the countless longstanding prohibitions 
on the possession of firearms by certain groups of individuals.47 
Skoien, however, urged the court to review § 922(g)(9) using the 
doctrine of strict scrutiny, which requires a court to examine any 
legislative action that impinges upon a fundamental right or involves 
the use of a suspect classification to ensure that it is narrowly tailored 
to serve a compelling governmental purpose.48 
Skoien urged the court to consider the doctrine of strict scrutiny 
when rendering its decision.49 In the opinion of the court, Judge Crabb 
acknowledged that strict scrutiny may be the appropriate standard to 
apply to a legislative effort to restrict firearm possession, but noted 
that it was unnecessary to resolve the issue in the instant case.50 The 
                                                 
44 Id. 
45 Id.; see Heller I, 554 U.S. at 582–83. 
46 Skoien I, 2008 WL 4682598, at *1. 
47 Id. (quoting Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626–27) (“[N]othing in our opinion should 
be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive 
places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”). 
48 Id.; see Sklar v. Byrne, 727 F.2d 633, 636 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Where the 
legislative classification works to the disadvantage of a constitutionally suspect 
class[,] . . . then courts may uphold the classification only if it is ‘precisely tailored 
to serve a compelling governmental interest.’”).  
49 Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider Motion to Dismiss 
Indictment, supra note 38, at 4–5. 
50 Skoien I, 2008 WL 4682598, at *1. 
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court declared that § 922(g)(9) passes constitutional muster under the 
doctrine of strict scrutiny because it is narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling governmental interest.51 The government has a compelling 
interest in protecting the families of individuals convicted of 
misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence because they pose the 
greatest harm to their families.52 The court noted that the Supreme 
Court’s acknowledgement of the existence of “longstanding 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons” in Heller53 is an 
express recognition of the fact that an individual may forfeit his right 
to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment when he commits 
a crime determined by the legislature to be of a serious nature.54 
Furthermore, the court noted that in enacting § 922(g)(9), Congress 
designated misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence as being serious 
in nature.55 
Judge Crabb then considered whether existing Seventh Circuit 
precedent upholding § 922(g)(9), based on the interpretation of the 
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms as a collective right, 
should be upheld in light of Heller I.56 The court referenced the 
Seventh Circuit decision in Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, which 
served as precedent in the district court case.57 The Gillespie court had 
noted that the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that 
United States v. Miller and its progeny confirm that the Second 
Amendment does not establish an individual right to possess a firearm 
independent from the role that possession of a firearm might play in 
maintaining a militia.58 Therefore, the court reasoned that § 922(g)(9) 
                                                 
51 Id. (“[Section 922(g)(9)] is narrowly tailored: it applies only to persons who 
have been found guilty by a court of domestic violence.”). 
52 Id. 
53 Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 626. 
54 Skoien I, 2008 WL 4682598, at *1.  
55 Id. 
56 Id. at *2. 
57 Id. 
58 Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 710 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The 
link that the [Second Amendment] draws between the ability ‘to keep and bear 
Arms’ and ‘[a] well regulated Militia’ suggests that the right protected is limited, one 
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is constitutional in the Seventh Circuit up and until either the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit or the Supreme Court specifically 
rules to the contrary.59 Judge Crabb proceeded to emphasize that the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit previously upheld the 
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the felon-in-possession 
statute,60 and that “[c]onstitutionally speaking, there is nothing 
remarkable about the extension of federal firearms disabilities to 
persons convicted of misdemeanors, as opposed to felonies.”61 
Therefore, Judge Crabb denied the motion to dismiss the indictment.62 
After reviewing precedent in the Seventh Circuit and in consideration 
of the recent Supreme Court decision in Heller I, the court found that § 
922(g)(9) is constitutional under the Second Amendment.63 
 
B. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
 
Skoien appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss.64 The 
defendant’s argument on appeal was that § 922(g)(9), known 
colloquially as the Lautenberg Amendment, violated his right to keep 
and bear arms under the Second Amendment.65 On appeal, the Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit engaged in a comprehensive review 
                                                                                                                   
that inures not to the individual but to the people collectively, its reach extending so 
far as is necessary to protect their common interest in protection by a militia.”); see 
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (holding that in the absence of a 
nexus between the firearm and the preservation or proficiency of a well-regulated 
militia, it cannot be said that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right 
to keep and bear arms). 
59 Skoien I, 2008 WL 4682598, at *2. 
60 See United States v. Price, 328 F.3d 958, 961 (7th Cir. 2003) (establishing 
that even under the individual rights model for interpreting the Second Amendment, 
the right to keep and bear arms can be restricted); accord United States v. Emerson, 
270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001). 
61 Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 706. 
62 Skoien I, 2008 WL 4682598, at *2. 
63 Id. 
64 See Defendant-Appellant’s Reply Brief at 1, Skoien II, 587 F.3d 803 (7th 
Cir. 2009) (No. 08-3770).  
65 Skoien II, 587 F.3d. at 807. 
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of the recent Supreme Court decision in Heller I. Writing for the court, 
Judge Sykes concluded that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate 
standard of review for Skoien’s Second Amendment challenge to the 
constitutionality of § 922(g)(9).66 After reiterating that the doctrine of 
intermediate scrutiny requires that a law be substantially related to an 
important governmental interest, Judge Sykes stated that the 
government has the burden of establishing “a reasonable fit between 
its important interest in reducing domestic gun violence and the means 
chosen to advance that interest,” namely the permanent disarmament 
of domestic violence misdemeanants under the Lautenberg 
Amendment.67 Accordingly, the court vacated the indictment and 
remanded the case to the district court with instructions to apply the 
doctrine of intermediate scrutiny.68 
To determine whether the doctrine of intermediate scrutiny or 
strict scrutiny should apply when reviewing the constitutionality of § 
922(g)(9), Judge Sykes noted that the Court in Heller held that the 
Second Amendment secures an individual pre-existing right to keep 
and bear arms for the defense of self, family, and home.69 After a 
thorough analysis of the text of the Second Amendment and the 
founding-era sources of its original conventional meaning, the 
Supreme Court in Heller I held that the Second Amendment does not 
declare a collective right to keep and bear arms, but rather it 
guarantees an individual right to armed defense not limited to service 
in a militia.70  
In Heller I, the Court highlighted the importance of logical nexus 
between the operative clause and the prefatory clause of the Second 
Amendment.71 The Court began with an analysis of the language of 
the operative clause: “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, 
                                                 
66 Id. at 816. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 807; see Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 591–95 (2008). 
70 Heller I, 554 U.S. at 598–99; Skoien II, 587 F.3d. at 807. 
71 Heller I, 554 U.S. at 577–78; Skoien II, 587 F.3d. at 806. 
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shall not be infringed.”72 The majority in Heller I proceeded to consult 
historical sources of information to identify the meaning of the 
language of the operative clause at the time of its codification.73 The 
Supreme Court determined that the elements of the operative clause of 
the Second Amendment guarantee an individual right to keep and bear 
arms in case of confrontation, a meaning that is confirmed by the fact 
that the right to keep and bear arms is a natural right.74 The Seventh 
Circuit noted that the Court analyzed the prefatory clause of the 
Second Amendment: “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a Free State.”75 The majority in Heller considered the 
aforementioned militia clause alongside the relevant historical 
background and concluded that the clause was not a limitation on the 
scope of the right to keep and bear arms, but rather it described the 
motivating purpose behind codifying the pre-existing right.76 The 
Court concluded that the right was codified in the Second Amendment 
to prevent the federal government from disarming the citizenry.77 The 
Seventh Circuit found this reasoning to be highly persuasive. Judge 
Sykes then noted that the Court invalidated the District of Columbia’s 
handgun ban78 as unconstitutional “[u]nder any of the standards of 
scrutiny that [the Supreme Court] ha[s] applied to enumerated 
                                                 
72 Skoien II, 587 F.3d. at 806; see U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
73 Heller I, 554 U.S. at 592–96. 
74 Heller I, 554 U.S. at 592 (“[The right to keep and bear arms] is not a right 
granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that 
instrument for its existence. The Second [A]mendment declares that it shall not be 
infringed . . .”). 
75 Skoien II, 587 F.3d at 807; see U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
76 Skoien II, 587 F.3d at 807. 
77 Heller I, 554 U.S. at 599 (“The prefatory clause does not suggest that 
preserving the militia was the only reason Americans valued the ancient right [to 
bear arms]; most undoubtedly [they] thought it even more important for self-defense 
and hunting. But the threat that the new Federal Government would destroy the 
citizens’ militia by taking away their arms was the reason that right . . . was 
codified.”). 
78 Skoien II, 587 F.3d at 808. 
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constitutional rights.”79 In a statement that has the potential to become 
as revered as the famous footnote in United States v. Carolene 
Products,80 the Court stated that “nothing in [its] opinion should be 
taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of 
firearms by felons and the mentally ill.”81 The majority in Skoien II 
noted that this list was not exhaustive, and the Supreme Court 
identified these presumptively lawful prohibitions only as examples.82 
Judge Sykes noted that the limiting language from Heller I is not 
mandatory authority, but rather it is persuasive dicta.83 Judge Sykes 
observed that the Supreme Court failed to shed light on the requisite 
standard of scrutiny that should be applied when reviewing these 
presumptively lawful regulatory measures.84 Therefore, Judge Sykes 
reasoned that all gun laws, aside from those that are categorically 
invalid under Heller I, must be independently justified.85  
The court reasoned that Heller established a framework for 
analyzing Second Amendment cases.86 Under this framework, a 
determination must first be made as to whether the gun law at issue is 
within the scope of the right to keep and bear arms as it was publicly 
understood when it was codified in the Second Amendment.87 Judge 
                                                 
79 Heller I, 554 U.S. at 628. 
80 See 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (stating that an exception to the 
presumption of constitutionality may be made and a heightened standard of judicial 
review may be required where “legislation appears on its face to be within a specific 
prohibition of the Constitution” or is aimed at a “discrete and insular minorit[y]”). 
81 Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626. 
82 Skoien II, 587 F.3d at 808; see Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626 n.26. 
83 Skoien II, 587 F.3d. at 808. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. (“[B]eyond [the Court’s reference to presumptively lawful regulatory 
measures], it is not entirely clear whether [the aforementioned language] should be 
taken to suggest that the listed firearms regulations are presumed to fall outside the 
scope of the Second Amendment right as it was understood at the time of the 
framing or that they are presumptively lawful under even the highest standard of 
scrutiny applicable to laws that encumber constitutional rights.”). 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 809. 
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Sykes noted, “If the government can establish [that a gun law falls 
outside the public understanding of the right], then the analysis need 
go no further.”88 If, however, the law at issue regulated conduct falling 
within the scope of the right, Judge Sykes declared that the law will be 
upheld only if the government can satisfy the applicable level of 
scrutiny.89 The court reasoned that the level of scrutiny is dependent 
on “the degree of fit required between the means and the end [and] 
how closely the law comes to the core of the right and the severity of 
the law’s burden on the right.”90 Thus, the court in Skoien II 
established a nexus test to determine the applicable level of scrutiny 
that a court must apply if a law regulates conduct falling within the 
scope of the right to keep and bear arms under the Second 
Amendment. 
Judge Sykes proceeded to employ the framework in Heller I to 
ascertain whether § 922(g)(9) violated Skoien’s Second Amendment 
right to keep and bear arms. The court stated that it would be difficult 
to argue that a traditional hunting shotgun falls outside the scope of the 
Second Amendment at the time of its adoption.91 The majority in 
Heller I highlighted the importance of long guns used for hunting 
during the founding era;92 ergo, Judge Sykes stated that the possession 
of standard hunting shotguns did not fall outside the parameters of the 
right as it was publicly understood when the Bill of Rights was 
ratified.93 However, the government did not try to justify § 922(g)(9) 
on a historical basis.94 Therefore, Judge Sykes proceeded to the 
second inquiry under Heller I, which required the court to determine 
                                                 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. (noting that this framework emphasizes the importance that the Supreme 
Court placed on the original meaning of the Second Amendment right to keep and 
bear arms, while simultaneously “attempt[ing] to reconcile the Court’s invalidation 
of the D.C. gun ban ‘under any standard of scrutiny’ with its reference to the 
existence of ‘presumptively lawful’ exceptions to the right to keep and bear arms.”). 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 810. 
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whether the restriction on Skoien’s right to bear arms is justified un
the applicable standard of review.
der 
r I 
                                                
95 Noting that the Court in Helle
rejected rational basis review,96 the minimum level of scrutiny, Judge 
Sykes reasoned that gun laws that severely restrict the core right under 
the Second Amendment are subject to an exacting scrutiny.97 Pointing 
to the Supreme Court’s dicta regarding presumptively lawful firearm 
laws, the court determined that strict scrutiny does not apply to § 
922(g)(9).98 Judge Sykes stated, “The Second Amendment challenge 
in this case is several steps removed from the core constitutional right 
identified in Heller [I].”99 Moreover, the court noted that Skoien based 
his constitutional challenge on the right to possess his shotgun for the 
purpose of hunting, and not on the right of self-defense.100 Therefore, 
because § 922(g)(9) does not severely burden Skoien’s Second 
Amendment right to possess a firearm for self-defense, Judge Sykes 
held that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review.101 
Under intermediate scrutiny, a challenged law will be upheld if the 
government establishes that the law is substantially related to an 
important governmental interest.102 Here, the court held that reducing 
domestic violence qualifies as an important governmental interest.103 
Furthermore, the court stated that a substantial nexus existed between 
the permanent disarmament of domestic violence misdemeanants 
under § 922(g)(9) and the government’s goal of preventing firearm-
 
95 Id. 
96 Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008). 
97 Skoien II, 587 F.3d. at 811. 
98 Id. at 812 (“[T]he [Supreme] Court’s willingness to presume the 
constitutionality of various firearms restrictions—especially prohibitions on firearms 
[sic] possession by felons—gives us ample reason to believe that strict scrutiny does 
not apply here.”). 
99 Id.; see Heller I, 554 U.S. at 635 (holding that at the core of the Second 
Amendment is the “right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense 
of hearth and home.”). 
100 Skoien II, 587 F.3d. at 812. 
101 Id. 
102 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
103 Skoien II, 587 F.3d. at 812. 
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related violence against domestic partners.104 Therefore, the court 
vacated Skoien’s conviction and remanded the case for further 
proceedings consistent with the aforementioned opinion.105 
 
C. Rehearing En Banc 
 
In Skoien III, the Seventh Circuit granted rehearing en banc and 
affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the Lautenberg 
Amendment is constitutional.106 Chief Judge Easterbrook, writing for 
the majority, refused to address the “‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire.”107 
The Chief Judge thought it sufficient that the government’s goal of 
“preventing armed mayhem” is an important governmental 
objective.108 Furthermore, Chief Judge Easterbrook reasoned that 
“[b]oth logic and data” establish a substantial relationship between the 
Lautenberg Amendment and the government’s objective of 
“preventing armed mayhem.”109 Although the court declined to apply 
a specific standard of scrutiny, it is evident that the court in Skoien II
implicitly applied intermediate scrutiny analysis to uphold the 
Lautenberg Amendment.
I 
                                                
110 Chief Judge Easterbrook, writing that “the 
goal of [the Lautenberg Amendment], preventing armed mayhem, is 
an important governmental objective,”111 and “[b]oth logic and data 
establish a substantial relation between [the Lautenberg Amendment] 
 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Skoien III, 614 F.3d 638, 645 (7th Cir. 2010). 
107 Id. at 641–42. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 642. 
110 See id.; see also Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (holding that a law 
survives intermediate scrutiny if it is substantially related to an important 
governmental interest). 
111 Skoien III, 614 F.3d at 642 (emphasis added). 
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and [preventing armed mayhem],”112 used terms of art that indicate the 
application of intermediate scrutiny review.113 
It is important to note that Skoien III, decided less than one month 
after McDonald, makes no mention of the Court’s holding that the 
Second Amendment is incorporated and fully applicable to the States 
by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.114 
This point is alluded to by Judge Sykes, the sole dissenting judge in 
Skoien III.115 By failing to address the Court’s decision in McDonald, 
Judge Sykes argued that “the pertinent question is how contemporary 
gun laws should be evaluated to determine whether they infringe the 
Second Amendment right [to keep and bear arms for self-defense].”116 
In addition, the Seventh Circuit neglected to examine the corpus of 
case law that applies strict scrutiny where a law infringes upon a right 
that is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty.117 
 
III. SECOND AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE AFTER HELLER I 
    
Despite the perspicuous holding in Heller I, the Supreme Court’s 
unwillingness to delve into the “‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire”118 has 
burdened the federal courts with the task of adjudicating Second 
Amendment challenges without a clear method for doing so. 
Consequently, courts inconsistently utilize a number of approaches to 
                                                 
112 Id. (emphasis added). 
113 See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461. 
114 See McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (plurality 
opinion). 
115 Skoien III, 614 F.3d at 648 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
116 Id. 
117 See, e.g., McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3023; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 202 (1995); Duncan v. State of Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 
(1968); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 
323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) 
(quoting Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243–44 (1936)).  
118 Skoien III, 614 F.3d at 641–42. 
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adjudicate Second Amendment challenges.119 In Heller v. District of 
Columbia (Heller II), an action was brought challenging the Firearms 
Registration Amendment Act, which was enacted in response to the 
Court’s ruling in Heller I, on Second Amendment grounds.120 The 
plaintiffs challenged three provisions of the new act: the firearms 
registration procedures, the prohibition on assault weapons, and the 
prohibition on devices that feed large capacity ammunition into 
firearms.121  
Heller II began with an overview of the various approaches used 
by courts to adjudicate Second Amendment challenges in the wake of 
Heller I.122 The court in Heller II determined that five approaches 
have been used by courts to review laws accused of violating the 
Second Amendment.123 The first method used by courts is to issue a
ruling without applying a specific standard of scrutiny.
 
ler 
ond 
                                                
124 Rather, these 
courts have simply determined whether the law at issue is a 
presumptively lawful longstanding prohibition as identified by Hel
I.125 Other courts have attempted to tackle the judicial scrutiny 
quandary as it applies to Second Amendment challenges.126 A small 
number of courts have applied the doctrine of strict scrutiny to Sec
 
119 See, e.g., United States v. Masciandaro, 648 F. Supp. 2d 779, 787–90 (E.D. 
Va. 2009) (holding that the challenged law is constitutional “under any elevated 
level of constitutional scrutiny”); United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 
162–63 (D. Me. 2008) (“A useful approach is to ask whether a statutory prohibition 
against the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill is similar enough to 
the statutory prohibition [at issue] to justify its inclusion in the list of ‘longstanding 
prohibitions’ [contained in the Heller dictum]”). 
120 Heller v. District of Columbia, 698 F. Supp. 2d 179, 181 (D.D.C. 2010) 
[hereinafter Heller II]. 
121 Id. at 185. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 See supra note 119. 
125 See id. 
126 See, e.g., Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 185. 
 354
18
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 11
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol6/iss1/11
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 6, Issue 1                            Fall 2010 
 
Amendment challenges,127 while the majority of courts have held that 
intermediate scrutiny is the proper standard of review.128 A fourth 
approach taken by courts involves applying elements of the undue 
burden test that is typically applied in the abortion context.129 Finally, 
a small number of courts have combined the above-mentioned 
approaches to form a hybrid method for reviewing Second 
Am
 a 
ard 
nd 
ment right a fundamental right, it would have done so 
explicitly.”134 
endment challenges.130 
In Heller II, the court concluded that intermediate scrutiny is the 
appropriate standard of review.131 The court reasoned that the Court in 
Heller I “did not explicitly hold that the Second Amendment right is
fundamental right,”132 and therefore strict scrutiny did not apply.133 
Although the majority in Heller I suggested that a heightened stand
of review should be applied to laws that interfere with the Seco
Amendment right to keep and bear arms, the court in Heller II 
reasoned that “[i]f the Supreme Court had wanted to declare the 
Second Amend
                                                 
127 See, e.g., United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231 (D. Ut
2009) (upholding the constituti
ah 
onality of the Lautenberg Amendment under strict 
scrut
439, 
lso Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992). 
 e.g., Skoien II, 587 F.3d 803, 812 (7th 
Cir. 
er II, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 186. 
ler 
 this right are subject to 
iny because it serves a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly 
tailored to serve this interest). 
128 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1171 (W.D. Tenn. 
2009); United States v. Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d 596, 606 (W.D. Pa. 2009). 
129 Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 185–86; see, e.g., Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 
459–60 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated on reh’g en banc, 611 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 
2010); see a
130 Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 186; see
2009). 
131 Hell
132 Id. at 187. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. (“The court will not infer such a significant holding based on the Hel
majority’s oblique references to the gun ownership rights of eighteenth-century 
English subjects.”); see United States v. Darrington, 351 F.3d 632, 635 (5th Cir. 
2003) (“if [a court] intended to recognize that the individual right to keep and bear 
arms is a ‘fundamental right,’ in the sense that restrictions on
 355
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In United States v. Yanez-Vasquez, the defendant was charged with 
possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5).135 The 
defendant argued that the statute, which prohibits the possession of a 
firearm by an illegal alien, violates his Second Amendment right to 
keep and bear arms.136 In Yanez-Vasquez, the court rebuffed the 
defendant’s contention that strict scrutiny should apply.137 The court 
declined to apply strict scrutiny because Heller I did not expressly 
declare that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is a 
fundamental right.138 
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller I, it is 
evident that a number of courts, adjudicating cases challenging 
legislation under the Second Amendment, are engaging in a literal 
reading of the Court’s dictum. The Heller I dictum regarding 
presumptively lawful longstanding prohibitions has been interpreted 
by courts to disqualify the use of strict scrutiny review for Second 
Amendment claims.139 A second, related problem, illustrated by a 
handful of courts, is an unwillingness to engage in meaningful judicial 
scrutiny. Rather than engage in meaningful judicial review, a number 
of courts merely determine whether the Lautenberg Amendment is 
“presumptively lawful” under Heller I. In United States v. White, the 
court proclaimed that they were tasked with “decid[ing] whether the 
statutory prohibition against the possession of firearms by persons 
convicted of the misdemeanor crime of domestic violence . . . warrants 
inclusion on [Heller I’s] list of presumptively lawful longstanding 
prohibitions.”140 This approach is problematic because judicial 
scrutiny is disregarded. Rather than assessing whether the means and 
ends of a statutory prohibition are related to an important or 
                                                                                                                   
‘strict scrutiny’ by the courts and require a ‘compelling state interest,’ it would have 
used these constitutional terms of art.”) (emphasis added). 
135 United States v. Yanez-Vasquez, No. 09-40056-01-SAC, 2010 WL 411112, 
at *1 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2010). 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at *5. 
138 Id. 
139 See cases cited supra notes 119–20. 
140 United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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compelling governmental interest, the court merely determines 
whether the prohibition at issue is analogous with the brief list of 
presumptively lawful longstanding prohibitions identified in Helle
I.
r 
possession of 
ar 
the Court 
urt would 
ntended for this locution to 
serv
 
 
ue 
t 
gal 
 
                                                
141 Moreover, courts engaging in this unmethodical standard of 
review fail to heed the words of the Court in Heller I. The Court stated 
that there a number of “longstanding prohibitions on the 
firearms,”142 and emphasized that these prohibitions are 
“presumptively lawful.”143 Yet the court in White and Skoien III appe
to ignore the term “presumptively.”144 Neither court engaged in the 
heightened standard of review required by Heller I.145 Had 
desired to establish a neoteric standard of review based on 
presumptively lawful longstanding prohibitions on the possession of 
firearms, it would have done so explicitly. In addition, the Co
not have referred to these longstanding prohibitions as being 
“presumptively lawful” in nature if it i
e as a standard of judicial review. 
Expanding on Heller I, McDonald v. City of Chicago is a 
landmark Supreme Court case that places federal courts in a position 
to implement strict scrutiny review in the area of Second Amendment
jurisprudence.146 Justice Alito, writing for the plurality, held that the
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for self-defense is 
incorporated and fully applicable to the States by virtue of the D
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.147 The Court in 
McDonald, charged with determining whether the Second Amendmen
right to keep and bear arms applied to the States, exercised the le
doctrine of incorporation to hold that the Second Amendment is
 
. 
t 627 n.26 (emphasis added). 
 of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
t 3050 (plurality opinion). 
141 See, e.g., id. at 1205–06. 
142 Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008)
143 Id. a
144 Id. 
145 See id. at 628 n.27; Skoien III, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010). 
146 See generally McDonald v. City
147 Id. a
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appl
, in 
 or 
Amendment,  Justice Alito held that the right to keep and 
bear rdered 
 
the 
                                                
icable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.148 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states
relevant part, that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty,
property, without due process of law.”149 Drawing largely on the 
historical record surrounding the framing and incorporation of the 
Fourteenth 150
 arms for self-defense is fundamental to our scheme of o
liberty.151  
The Court’s decision in McDonald may have profound 
implications for the manner in which courts evaluate the 
constitutionality of laws prohibiting the possession of firearms. It is 
“widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and 
Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right.”152 These rights are
so “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,”153 that they 
are fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty.154 Accordingly, 
 
f. 
re 
f 
munities 
Clau
 S. Ct. at 3066; Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008) 
(emp
 S. Ct. at 3023 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. 
ouisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). 
148 Id.  
149 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
150 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036–44. 
151 Id. at 3042; see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). But c
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3059–62 (Thomas, J., concurring) (Although Justice 
Thomas agreed with the Court that the right to keep and bear arms is applicable to 
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, he argued that incorporation through 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, rather than the Due Process Clause, is a mo
straightforward path. Justice Thomas stated that “fundamental” rights, some o
which are not enumerated in the Constitution, are a legal fiction that arose in 
response to the marginalization of the Privileges or Immunities Clause following the 
Court’s decision in the Slaughter-House Cases); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 
(1873) (determining that there is a sharp distinction between the privileges and 
immunities of state and those of federal citizenship, and the Privileges or Im
se protects only the latter category of rights from State infringement). 
152 McDonald, 130
hasis in original). 
153 McDonald, 130
702, 721 (1997)). 
154 See supra note 146; Duncan v. L
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Cour he 
case for further proceedings in accordance with their decision.155 
 infringes on the 
Seco
ental 
 review, 
d law is 
t.158 
y 
rnment’s purpose is 
com
      
t reversed the judgment of the Seventh Circuit and remanded t
  
IV.  A CASE FOR THE ADOPTION OF STRICT SCRUTINY REVIEW 
 
In light of McDonald, there is ample evidence to support the 
application of strict scrutiny review to legislation that
nd Amendment right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. 
Although the right is not unqualified, laws encumbering fundam
rights are often subjected to strict scrutiny review.156 
Strict scrutiny was conceived by implication in a footnote of 
United States v. Carolene Products157 and is currently the most 
exacting form of judicial scrutiny. To withstand strict scrutiny
the government has the burden of proving that the challenge
narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interes
Supreme Court precedent often requires that laws restricting 
fundamental rights be evaluated under strict scrutiny,159 as 
intermediate scrutiny is an insufficient standard of review for 
legislation that infringes on fundamental rights. Intermediate scrutin
is a less exacting form of scrutiny and requires that a law be 
substantially related to an important governmental objective.160 In 
other words, a court need not find that the gove
pelling, but it must characterize the objective as important. In 
                                           
155 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050. 
156 See supra note 117. But see Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 43
(holding that t
4 (1992) 
he First Amendment right to freedom of speech, while a fundamental 
right iew for ballot-access 
restr
6, 326 (2003) (upholding the admissions 
polic  
 in nature, is subject to a flexible standard of rev
ictions). 
157 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
158 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 30
y of the University of Michigan Law School). 
159 See cases cited supra note 117. 
160 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
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order to trigger intermediate scrutiny, a law must “implicate an 
important, though not constitutional, right.”161 
Legal scholars and judicial opinions have suggested that strict 
scrutiny is an outcome-determinative standard of judicial review. 
According to legal scholar Paul Kahn, “[C]ontemporary equal 
protection law has essentially identified ‘exacting’ judicial 
with judicial invalidation.”
scrutiny 
 face 
idate a number of laws and extend 
constitutional protections to various fundamental rights.164 “[O]nce the 
Court sorts the case into one or another constitutional bin [strict 
scrutiny or rational basis], the outcome is virtually foreordained.”165 
162 The Supreme Court has echoed these 
sentiments, noting that “[o]nly rarely are statutes sustained in the
of strict scrutiny.”163 In fact, this is an easy argument to make when 
reviewing Warren Court decisions. The Warren Court used strict 
scrutiny review to inval
This argument has been reiterated in the wake of Heller I,166 but it 
rema  unfounded.167 ins
                                                 
161 United States v. Coleman, 166 F.3d 428, 431 (2d Cir. 1999); see Eisenbu
v. Suffolk 
d 
County, 841 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1988). 
: The 
e 
of less  because it 
perm 2 
 405–06 (1963) (invalidating a law restricting the freedom of religious 
expr
ien II, 587 F.3d 803, 813 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that strict scrutiny 
is a d icial review that is intentionally difficult to overcome, 
“in deference to the primacy of the individual liberties the Constitution secures.”); 
162 Paul W. Kahn, The Court, The Community, and the Judicial Balance
Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1987). 
163 Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 n.6 (1984) (citing Gerald Gunther, Th
Supreme Court, 1971 Term – Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a 
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 
(1972)). 
164 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (invalidating a 
statut  proory hibition of welfare benefits to residents  than one year
im issibly restricted the right to travel); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–1
(1967) (invalidating legislation banning miscegenation); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 
U.S. 398,
ession); see also Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An 
Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 
805 (2006). 
165 Winkler, supra note 164, at 807 (quoting JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, 
CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 55 
(1997)). 
166 E.g., Sko
emanding standard of jud
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Strict scrutiny is not “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”168 The 
phrase “strict in theory and fatal in fact,”169 penned by Gerald 
Gunther, has become “one of the most quoted lines in legal 
literature”170 and has been parroted in numerous judicial opinions.171
Recently, the Supreme Court has attempted to expunge the belief that 
strict scrutiny is an outcome-determinative test, always resulting in 
invalidation of the challenged legislation. In Adarand Constructors
Inc. v. Pena, Justice O’Connor declared that the Court intended to
“dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in
fact.’”
 
, 
 
 
the 
e 
 
 
 
        
172 Justice O’Connor argued that requiring strict scrutiny is 
most effective way to ensure that courts consistently engage in a 
detailed examination of both the ends and means of a challenged 
law.173 In Johnson v. California, Justice O’Conner again argued 
against the notion that strict scrutiny is fatal in fact, writing that “[t]h
fact that strict scrutiny applies ‘says nothing about the ultimate validity
of any particular law; that determination is the job of the court 
applying strict scrutiny.’”174 In a recent case, Grutter v. Bollinger, the 
Supreme Court upheld the affirmative action admission policy at the
University of Michigan Law School.175 Justice O’Connor, writing for 
the majority, declared that the school’s use of race in its admissions
                                                                                                           
 
 on the 
scrutiny review). 
ing Gunther, supra note 163, at 8). 
ivan, Gerald Gunther: The Man and the Scholar, 55 STAN. 
L. R
, 515 U.S. at 237; Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265, 
rand, 515 U.S. at 237. 
v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 515 (2005) (quoting Adarand, 515 
U.S.
6, 339 (2003). 
Dennis A. Henigan, The Heller Paradox, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1171, 1197 (2009)
(arguing that the discussion of presumptively lawful longstanding prohibitions
possession of firearms in Heller must be read as an implicit rejection of strict 
167 See supra note 158. 
168 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (quot
169 Gunther, supra note 163, at 8. 
170 Kathleen M. Sull
EV. 643, 645 (2002). 
171 See Adarand
361–62 (1978). 
172 Ada
173 Id. 
174 Johnson 
 at 229–30). 
175 539 U.S. 30
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policy was narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest in the 
unique education benefits that emanate from a diverse student b
A number of legal scholars have aligned themselves with Justice 
O’Connor. According to Adam Winkler, “[S]trict scrutiny exists 
precisely to permit regulation where ordinarily none is allowed.”
ody.176 
 
strict scrutiny review is becoming less 
rigo
is due to a 
 
irst 
f 
ures 
 
n the 
s to 
      
177
Others have argued that 
rous, as evidenced by the aforementioned decisions. Ashutosh 
Bhagwat argued that the relaxation of strict scrutiny review 
sudden willingness by the Court to engage in genuine inquiry of 
legislative purposes.178 
In Grutter, Justice O’Connor asserted that “context matters” when
strict scrutiny is applied.179 Context is equally relevant to a 
determination of the applicable standard of review in Skoien III. In 
Skoien II, Judge Sykes noted the importance of context in the First 
Amendment sphere. Judge Sykes, in an attempt to analogize the F
Amendment right to freedom of speech with the Second Amendment, 
noted that “[i]n the First Amendment free-speech context, the rigor o
this heightened form of review tends to fluctuate with the character 
and degree of the challenged law’s burden on the right”.180 In the 
realm of election regulations, laws that restrict the right to expressive 
association are subject to varying levels of scrutiny depending upon 
the nature and severity of the burden on the right; laws that impose 
severe burdens are subject to strict scrutiny, while regulatory meas
imposing more modest burdens are reviewed more leniently.181 In the
Second Amendment realm, while recent decisions have focused o
relationship between the right of “law-abiding, responsible citizen
                                           
176 Id. at 343. 
177 Winkler, supra note 164, at 805. 
se Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL L. 
REV. 
, 587 F.3d 803, 813 (7th Cir. 2009). 
h. State Republican Party, 552 
U.S.
178 Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpo
297, 299 (1997). 
179 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327. 
180 Skoien II
181 Id.; see, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Was
 442 (2008). 
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use arms in defense of hearth and home,”182 the Court in Heller I
stated that Americans valued the ancient right to keep and bear ar
for self-defense and hunting.
 
ms 
t 
The 
ifetime 
whether Skoien had focused 
his c ight of 
 
self-defense.  
When examined alongside McDonald, the nature of the 
imposition and severity of the burden on the right to keep and bear 
arms for self-defense under the Lautenberg Amendment necessitates 
the use of strict scrutiny. 
 
                                                
183 Judge Sykes acknowledged this 
ancient right, but argued that the right to keep and bear arms for 
hunting was not analogous to the core Second Amendment right 
identified in Heller I.184 However, the decisions in Skoien II and 
Skoien III neglected to take context into account. While the court in 
Skoien II failed to consider the legislative intent behind the enactmen
of the Lautenberg Amendment, the court in Skoien III neglected to 
evaluate the severity of the burden imposed by the amendment. 
Lautenberg Amendment imposes a severe burden on the right to keep 
and bear arms for self-defense under the Second Amendment;185 the 
amendment “bars all persons who have been convicted of a domestic-
violence misdemeanor from ever possessing a firearm for any 
reason.”186 The court emphasized that “[i]t is a comprehensive l
ban; . . . [t]here are no exceptions.”187 This is a considerable burden 
for an individual to bear. Irrespective of 
onstitutional challenge on the core Second Amendment r
self-defense, as identified in Heller I,188 his conviction under § 
922(g)(9) will permanently bar Skoien from possessing a firearm “for
any reason,”189 including 
 
182 See Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
183 Id. at 599. 
184 Skoien II, 587 F.3d at 812. 
185 See infra note 235. 
186 Skoien II, 587 F.3d at 811 (emphasis in original). 
187 Id. 
188 See id. at 812. 
189 Id. at 811. 
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A. Narrow Tailoring 
 
To pass constitutional muster, legislation subject to strict scrutiny 
review must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling 
governmental interest.190 Narrow tailoring requires serious, good faith 
consideration of reasonable alternatives that would achieve the 
government’s legislative goal.191 Narrow tailoring does not, however, 
require an exhaustive review of every conceivable alternative.192 It is 
therefore imperative to evaluate the objective of the legislature in 
ratifying § 922(g)(9).  
 The Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1968 is 
a sweeping regulatory statute that was enacted to prevent the use of 
firearms in violent domestic disputes.193 Amid a growing concern that 
permitting domestic aggressors to possess firearms would have grave 
consequences for domestic victims, the Lautenberg Amendment was 
enacted to disqualify individuals convicted of misdemeanor crimes of 
domestic violence from possessing firearms.194 Senator Lautenberg 
sought to disarm domestic aggressors because “[e]ven after a split, the 
individuals involved often by necessity have a continuing relationship 
of some sort.”195 
  In Heller I, the Supreme Court noted that its decision does not 
cast doubt on a number of longstanding prohibitions on the possession 
of firearms by well-defined groups of individuals.196 The Lautenberg 
Amendment has been categorized as a lawful prohibition on the 
possession of firearms,197 and states in relevant part: 
 
                                                 
190 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). 
191 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003). 
192 Id. 
193 142 CONG. REC. S2646-01 (1996) (statement of Sen. Frank Lautenberg). 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at S2646-02. 
196 Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). 
197 See Skoien III, 614 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been 
convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence, to ship or transport in interstate or foreign 
commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm 
or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition 
which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign 
commerce.198 
 
While the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) have been a source of 
legal controversy, the judiciary has upheld the constitutionality of the 
Lautenberg Amendment.199 In United States v. Hayes, the Supreme 
Court took the opportunity to examine the Lautenberg Amendment 
and inquire into the reasoning behind its enactment.200 In Hayes, the 
defendant was indicted and charged under § 922(g)(9) for possessing 
firearms after having been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence.201 The defendant was originally charged and 
convicted in 1994 under a West Virginia statute that did not require a 
domestic relationship between the aggressor and victim, but rather was 
a common battery prohibition.202 The defendant moved to dismiss the 
indictment on the grounds that § 922(g)(9) applies only to individuals 
previous convicted of an offense that specifies, as an element, a 
domestic relationship between the offender and victim.203 Writing for 
the majority, Justice Ginsburg reasoned that construing § 922(g)(9) to 
exclude persons who engaged in domestic abuse and were convicted 
under a generic use-of-force statute—one that does not require a 
                                                 
198 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006).  
199 See United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1205 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding 
that § 922(g)(9) warrants inclusion on the list of presumptively lawful longstanding 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms); In re United States, 578 F.3d 1195, 1200 
(10th Cir. 2009) (order granting petition for writ of mandamus) (“Nothing suggests 
that the Heller dictum, which we must follow, is not inclusive of § 922(g)(9) 
involving those convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence.”). 
200 See generally 129 S. Ct. 1079 (2009). 
201 Id. at 1087. 
202 Id. at 1083. 
203 Id. 
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domestic relationship—“would frustrate Congress’ manifest 
purpose.”204 The government must, however, prove the existence of a 
domestic relationship in order to establish that the underlying 
misdemeanor qualifies as a predicate offense.205 In order to 
substantiate her claim, Justice Ginsburg looked to § 921(a)(33)(A), 
which defines the term “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” as 
an offense that:  
 
(i) is a misdemeanor under Federal, State, or Tribal law; and 
 
(ii) has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical 
force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed 
by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the 
victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in 
common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited 
with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a 
person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of 
the victim.206  
 
Justice Ginsburg determined that the definition contained in § 
922(a)(33)(A) contains two requirements: First, a misdemeanor crime 
of domestic violence must “[have], as an element, the use or attempted 
use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon”;207 
and second, the crime must be “committed by” an individual who has 
a particular domestic relationship with the victim as identified by the 
statute.208 In her opinion, Justice Ginsburg noted that existing felon-in-
                                                 
204 Id. at 1087. 
205 Id. 
206 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) (2006); see United States v. White, 593 F.3d 
1199, 1204 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that the defendant’s relationship with his live-
in girlfriend constituted a domestic relationship for the purposes of §§ 922(g)(9) and 
921(a)(33)(A)); United States v. Shelton, 325 F.3d 553, 563 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that defendant’s concession that he lived with his girlfriend was sufficient to satisfy 
the domestic relationship requirement under §§ 922(g)(9) and 921(a)(33)(A)). 
207 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). 
208 Id.; Hayes, 129 S. Ct. at 1084. 
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possession laws failed to keep firearms out of the hands of persons 
who engaged in domestic abuse,209 writing that the language of § 
921(a)(33)(A) does not require that the predicate offense include, as an 
individual element, the existence of a domestic relationship between 
the offender and victim.210 Rather, it is sufficient that the prior crime 
was an offense committed by the defendant against a domestic victim 
as proscribed by § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).211 Accordingly, the Court in 
Hayes held that “Congress defined ‘misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence’ to include an offense ‘committed by’ a person who had a 
specified domestic relationship with the victim, whether or not the 
misdemeanor statute itself designates the domestic relationship as an 
element of the crime.”212  
Dissenting from the majority in Skoien III, Judge Sykes reiterated 
many of the arguments made in Skoien II. A number of these 
assertions are analogous with the Court’s holding in Hayes.213 Judge 
Sykes noted that the statutory definition of misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence limits the applicability of § 922(g)(9) to persons 
who used or attempted to use physical force, or threatened the use of a 
deadly weapon against a domestic victim.214 The statute thus applies 
only to a narrowly defined class of violent offender: “only those who 
have already used or attempted to use force or have threatened the use 
of a deadly weapon against a domestic victim are banned from 
possessing firearms.”215  
While attempting to analogize the Lautenberg Amendment to the 
list of presumptively lawful longstanding prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms in Heller I, the court in White inadvertently 
                                                 
209 Hayes, 129 S. Ct. at 1093; see 142 CONG. REC. S2646-02 (1996) (statement 
of Sen. Frank Lautenberg). 
210 Hayes, 129 S. Ct. at 1084. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 1089. 
213 See Skoien III, 614 F.3d 638, 650 (7th Cir. 2010) (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
214 See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) (2006); Skoien II, 587 F.3d 803, 816 (7th 
Cir. 2009). 
215 Skoien II, 587 F.3d at 816; see Skoien III, 614 F.3d at 650 (Sykes, J., 
dissenting). 
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called attention to the narrow tailoring of the Lautenberg 
Amendment.216 By noting that the Lautenberg Amendment was 
designed to “close [a] dangerous loophole” that permitted domestic 
abusers to possess firearms,217 the court highlighted an element of the 
Lautenberg Amendment that exudes narrow tailoring: it was enacted to 
close a loophole. A ‘loophole’ is defined as “[a]n ambiguity, omission, 
or exception . . . that provides a way to avoid a rule without violating 
its literal requirements.”218 In the eyes of Congress, domestic abusers 
were narrowly escaping felony convictions.219 As a result, the 
Lautenberg Amendment was enacted to bring domestic violence 
misdemeanants under the scope of the felon-in-possession ban. 
 The White court proceeded to note that the felon-in-possession 
ban, a presumptively lawful prohibition under Heller I,220 results in 
both an armed robber and tax evader losing their right to possess a 
firearm under § 922(g)(1).221 The court contrasted this outcome with 
that of an individual convicted under the Lautenberg Amendment.222 
For the Lautenberg Amendment to apply, an individual must have first 
acted violently toward a family member or domestic partner, a 
predicate offense demonstrated by a misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence conviction.223 Although the court illustrated this distinction to 
substantiate its claim that the Lautenberg Amendment warrants 
inclusion in the list of presumptively lawful prohibitions recognized in 
Heller I,224 the court perfectly distinguished an overinclusive law from 
a law that is underinclusive. In determining whether challenged 
legislation is narrowly tailored, courts favor laws that are 
                                                 
216 See United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1205–06 (11th Cir. 2010). 
217 Id. at 1205 (citing 142 CONG. REC. S2646-02 (1996) (statement of Sen. 
Frank Lautenberg)). 
218 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 962 (8th ed. 2004). 
219 White, 593 F.3d at 1205. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. at 1206. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. 
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underinclusive rather than overinclusive.225 In White, the court noted 
that the felon-in-possession ban in § 922(g)(1) “does not distinguish 
between the violent and non-violent offender.”226 Thus, the domestic 
violence misdemeanant ban under the Lautenberg Amendment, which 
applies only to a particular class of abusive misdemeanants, is 
narrowly tailored. 
 
B. Compelling Governmental Interest 
 
In Korematsu v. United States,227 an early Supreme Court case 
involving the application of strict scrutiny review, the Court 
determined that “[p]ressing public necessity” may sometimes warrant 
interference with constitutional rights.228 Courts are likely to uphold 
challenged legislation when there is a pressing public necessity, such 
as national security.229 A pressing public necessity must still be 
narrowly tailored, irrespective of the nature of the necessity.230 In 
Grutter, Justice O’Connor noted that, in the area of race based 
classifications, “[w]here the Court has accepted only national security, 
and rejected even the best interests of a child, as a justification for 
racial discrimination, I conclude that only those measures the State 
must take . . . to prevent violence, will constitute a ‘pressing public 
necessity.’”231 Today, “pressing public policy,” frequently termed 
                                                 
225 See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (“[Legislative] 
reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem 
which seems most acute to the legislative mind.”); Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of 
San Antonio, 330 F.3d 288, 293 n.6 (11th Cir. 2003) (“narrow tailoring . . . prohibits 
regulations [of adult businesses] that are substantially broader than necessary”) 
(alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
226 White, 593 F.3d at 1206. 
227 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
228 Id.; accord Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 351 (2003). 
229 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. 
230 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 351. 
231 Id. at 353 (emphasis added). 
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“compelling governmental interest,”232 is still without a bright-line 
rule. 
The Gun Control Act of 1968 has long prohibited the possession 
of a firearm by any individual convicted of a felony.233 In 2006, the 
104th United States Congress saw the opportunity to extend the 
prohibition to include individuals convicted of a misdemeanor crime 
of domestic violence.234 Senator Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey, the 
sponsor of the provision, sought to close the dangerous loophole that 
enabled a person convicted of a crime involving domestic violence to 
possess a firearm.235 The senator recognized that existing prohibitions 
against felony possession failed to keep firearms out of the hands of 
domestic abusers because “many people who engage in serious 
spousal or child abuse ultimately are not charged with or convicted of 
felonies.”236 Senator Lautenberg referenced data from a New England 
Journal of Medicine report, indicating that a gun inside the residence 
of a home with a history of domestic abuse results in a five hundred 
percent increase in the likelihood that a woman would be murdered.237 
Crimes of domestic violence involve persons who share a history 
together,238 yet many who commit these heinous offenses are never 
prosecuted.239 One-third of individuals who commit crimes of 
domestic violence and are charged with misdemeanors would be 
charged as felons if the act were committed against a stranger.240  
Senators Patricia Murray and Dianne Feinstein joined Senator 
Lautenberg in supporting the amendment because “the gun is the key 
ingredient most likely to turn a domestic violence incident into a 
                                                 
232 Id. 
233 United States v. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. 1079, 1082 (2009). 
234 142 CONG. REC. S2646-01 (1996) (statement of Sen. Frank Lautenberg). 
235 Id. at S2646-02. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. 
238 Id. 
239 142 CONG. REC. S8831-06 (1996) (statement of Sen. Frank Lautenberg). 
240 Id. 
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homicide.”241 Senator Feinstein cited ineffective and outdated laws as 
the reason many domestic violence offenders are not charged as 
felons.242 The senator also proclaimed that plea bargains and the 
reluctance of victims to cooperate, either out of fear of additional 
violence or an unwillingness to partake in an overwhelming trial, 
result in misdemeanor convictions for crimes that ordinarily are 
felonies.243  
By enacting § 922(g)(9), it is evident that Congress endeavored to 
narrow the gap that permitted individuals convicted of misdemeanor 
crimes of domestic violence to possess a firearm. Senator Lautenberg 
and his colleagues were concerned that permitting aggressors to 
possess firearms would have parlous consequences for domestic 
violence victims.244 In the First Amendment free speech context, a 
federal statute banning the broadcast of indecent material during a 
specified period of time during the day passed constitutional muster 
because the government has a valid interest in supplementing parental 
supervision of children’s exposure to indecent material and promoting 
the well-being of minors.245 
The Lautenberg Amendment satisfies two compelling 
governmental interests. The domestic violence misdemeanant firearm 
ban closes a dangerous loophole that previously allowed individuals 
who engaged in serious spousal or child abuse to possess a firearm. 
Were it not for mitigating circumstances, these individuals would be 
convicted as felons and subject to the felon-in-possession handgun ban 
under § 922(g)(9). By keeping firearms out of the hands of violent 
domestic offenders, the Lautenberg Amendment also serves the 
compelling governmental interest of preventing violence against 
spouses and children.246 Furthermore, based on the assertion that the 
                                                 
241 142 Cong. Rec. S10379-01 (1996) (statement of Sen. Patricia Murray). 
242 Id. at 10380 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein). 
243 Id. 
244 See 142 CONG. REC. S2646-02 (1996) (statement of Sen. Frank 
Lautenberg). 
245 Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 678 (D.C. Cir 1995). 
246 See supra note 193. 
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government has both a legitimate and compelling interest in 
preventing crime,247 one would be hard-pressed to challenge the 
assertion that the government has a strong interest in preventing 
domestic abusers from possessing firearms.248  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Some may question the significance of debating the appropriate 
standard of scrutiny for laws that infringe on the Second Amendment 
right to keep and bear arms.249 However, in the absence of an explicit 
standard of review for Second Amendment jurisprudence, the federal 
courts are left without a clear standard for resolving challenges to 
existing firearm legislation. 
The view of the Rehnquist Court, that strict scrutiny is strict in 
theory and not fatal in fact, should herald the use of strict scrutiny 
review in adjudicating challenges to laws that strike at the core Second 
Amendment right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.250 Shortly 
after the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in McDonald, wherein 
the Court held that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms 
for self-defense is incorporated and fully applicable to the States by 
virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,251 the 
Seventh Circuit was presented with the opportunity to address the 
“‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire”252 left unanswered by Heller I.253 
                                                 
247 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987). 
248 See 142 CONG. REC. S2646-02 (1996) (statement of Sen. Frank 
Lautenberg); see also Matthew Miller et al., State-Level Homicide Victimization 
Rates in the U.S. in Relation to Survey Measures of Household Firearm Ownership, 
2001–2003, 2/1/07 SOC. SCI. & MED. 656 (2003). 
249 Cf. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 610 (1990) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (“This dispute regarding the appropriate standard of review may strike 
some as a lawyers’ quibble over words”). But cf. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 
515 U.S. 200, 247 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
250 See Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008). 
251 McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (plurality 
opinion).  
252 Skoien III, 614 F.3d 638, 641–42 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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 373
Rather than attempting to determine the appropriate standard of 
judicial scrutiny, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the 
Lautenberg Amendment need only satisfy heightened scrutiny to pass 
constitutional muster.254 Thus, by turning a blind eye to recent federal 
practice, the Seventh Circuit overlooked an opportunity to solidify its 
position as a dynamic, erudite court by pioneering the implementation 
of strict scrutiny review for legislation that unconstitutionally 
interferes with the core Second Amendment right. 
                                                                                                                   
253 See Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626–30. 
254 See Skoien III, 614 F.3d at 641–42. 
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